This article analyzes Swedish political scientist and conservative politician Rudolf Kjellén's advocacy in favour of a Swedish "Baltic program" directed at the Baltic Sea region and Russia in the decades preceding the First World War. These Baltic ambitions as well as their legacy in the interwar period are studied as a series of exercises in "para-diplomacy" on three different levels: 1) as a geopolitical reconstruction of a Baltic-Nordic "space of expectation;" 2) as a kind of Baltic-Nordic regionalism based upon early notions of "soft power;" and 3) as an inspiration to the geopolitical outlook of the Swedish military elite, business circles and trade policy-makers in the time period from the First World War up to the Second World War. This "region-work in the margins" contributed to modernizing Swedish conservative elites' geopolitical outlook into an ostensibly less aggressive vision of Swedish international influence through cultural, economic, and technological prowess.
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The author gratefully acknowledges support from CBEES, the Centre for Baltic and East European Studies at Södertörn University, towards the completion of this study. 1 For useful overviews of Baltic-Swedish interrelations from the First World War to the early Cold War years, see e.g. Mellan björnen och örnen: Sverige och Östersjöområdet under det första världskriget, 1914-1918, ed . by Johan Engström and Lars Ericson (Stock-At times, however, Sweden -a cosmopolitan in splendid isolation -has appeared on the verge of integrating with its immediate neighborhood. The fall of the wall in 1989 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, for example, temporarily reduced great power tension, globally as well as around this Northern European inland sea. This "window of opportunity" allowed for the possible reformulation of a Baltic regional project. Centered on the sea and manifested early on through the creation of the Council for the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) in 1992, a host of other macro-regional initiatives have followed. Successive Swedish governments, both left and right, have actively sought to promote closer Baltic-Nordic regional cooperation. Notably, the bourgeois government of Prime Minister Carl Bildt and the social democratic governments of Prime Minister Göran Persson (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) , have taken on leading roles in this context. 2 Against this backdrop, this article studies the relationship between earlier "windows of opportunity" -here understood as political conjectures which could potentially allow for a reimagination or rearrangement of regional relations -during the first half of the twentieth century as well as the successive attempts at capitalizing on these favourable moments for Baltic regionalism through various practices of "region-work in the margins." 3 A key actor in this context has been Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellén. Internationally mostly known as the "father of geopolitics," Kjellén was also a conservative politician and a prominent advocate for a more active Swedish foreign and trade policy in the years between the dissolution of the Union between Sweden and Norway in 1905 and the outbreak of the First World War in 1914. During this intense and tensionridden decade in Swedish political history, Kjellén argued that Sweden needed to adopt a purposive "Baltic programme" with a view of not only extending Sweden's cultural and economic influence in the Baltic region in general and Russia in particular, but also establishing a new and more proactive position for itself in the global world order. While Kjellén's scientific activities have long interested geographers, historians and political scientists internationally, Swedish researchers have mostly concentrated upon Kjellén's importance for Swedish domestic politics as a strategist for the unghögern, the Swedish Young Rightists, or the "Young Right." 4 In particular, his role in the emergence of folkhem (Peoples' Home) rhetoric and the conservative origins of this metaphor -later famously adopted by the social democrats as a rhetorical embodiment of the welfare state -has come under intensive and sometimes heated debate. This article primarily makes use of Kjellén's political journalism and popular science writings in Swedish on the regional position of Sweden, rather than his often German-language academic works. Widely read and discussed at the time, also by his social democratic and liberal critics, these writings serve as an entry point for an analysis of the broader context of predominantly conservative Swedish geopolitical imagination and subsequent region-work aimed at supporting future-oriented Swedish commercial and cultural activity in the Baltic Sea region and adjoining areas of Northwestern Russia. The article aims to place these rather lofty and admittedly marginal dreams in the context of actual economic and political conditions of Baltic-Russian-Swedish relations.
As such, these Swedish ambitions directed at the broader Baltic Sea region are here analyzed as a series of exercises in "para-diplomacy" on three different levels: First, they are studied as part of a geopolitical (re)-construction of a Baltic-Nordic "space of expectation" through practices of mental mapping, geographical imagination and historiographical reinterpretation of the early-twentieth-century inland sea, primarily based upon historical analogies with the seventeenth-century Swedish Empire.
7 Second, they are interpreted as early attempts at generating a kind of Baltic-Nordic regionalism based upon "soft power," projected through the intended usage of various immaterial power resources such as "Swedish" technical skills, know-how and business acumen in exploiting the Baltic and Russian markets to Swedish benefit. 8 Third and finally, the article discusses the legacy and impact of Kjellén's Baltic programme upon Swedish business circles and policy-makers in the time period from the First World War to the Second World War. In conclusion, the article argues that the particular phenomenon of Swedish conservatives' projecting future Swedish grandeur not only onto the nearby Baltic Sea region and Northwestern Russia, but also to Africa, 9 the Arctic 10 and the Far East, 11 must be understood as part of a broader conservative re-reading of the logic of previous Swedish historical development as predominantly determined by "modern" factors, such as economic interests and political opportunities, rather than archaic aggression or heroism per se, a re-reading which sought to make Swedish foreign policy activism, both past and future, appear economically viable, politically sound and morally palatable to audiences both at home and abroad.
History: empire or enterprise?
In 1899, as the union between Sweden and Norway entered a new phase of tension, Swedish conservatives rallied around the objective of forcing Norway to remain within the union. Although an outspoken conservative, Rudolf Kjellén probed an alternate position in an article ostensibly dealing with the issue of Sweden's "borders."
12 Even if Kjellén regarded a Norwegian secession as a potential national and moral catastrophe for Sweden, he also noted that the ongoing conflict with the Norwegians on numerous economic and political matters sapped Swedish resources. 13 In fact, Kjellén argued, the union with Norway was far from "natural." The mountains separating the two quarreling nations split the Scandinavian Peninsula into two halves, one facing west and the other turning towards the east. Basing himself upon the latest findings of geological science, Kjellén sought to demonstrate how the geological "Baltic Shield" and the Baltic Sea's "water system" spelled a more natural geographical frame of reference for Sweden's spatial belonging than the Scandinavian Peninsula did.
14 Politically, Sweden was part of "a larger geographical unit, Fennoscandia," Kjellén 16 Kjellén, Inledning till Sveriges geografi, 39, 54, 172-175. A similar logic encouraged Sir Halford Mackinder to later extend his famous notion of the Heartland -i.e., Eurasia -as the pivot of history to also include the lands draining into the Baltic "since no comparable land power lay between Western Russia and the coastlands of eastern Denmark and southern Sweden, the shores of the Skaggerak strait and the lands needed if one wished to close access to the Baltic." See Gerry Kearns, "Beyond the legacy of Mackinder," Geopolitics, 18:4 (2013), 918. The view that the Baltic extension of the Swedish Empire geographically matched the extension of Scandinavia including Finland would eventually become rather widespread in Swedish historiography. For example, a widely distributed work on Swedish history, edited by National Antiquarian Emil Hildebrand among others, echoed -without referencing -Kjellén's emphasis upon the lack of natural borders and the predominantly Baltic and essentially circummarine character of the Swedish Empire. Martin Weibull, "Geografisk öfversikt af det svenska But Kjellén did not only make use of geological considerations in his search for an answer to the question of Sweden's "natural place on earth" and its regional identity. He also provided a more historical analysis by analyzing and comparing earlier periods of Swedish geographical expansion. Sweden's first expansion in eleventh century was certainly based upon "commercial interests," Kjellén argued. But it had lacked in geopolitical logic and staying power. The second Swedish expansion during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was also short-lived. Yet: "While the former [Swedish expansion] stumbled eastward without any conscious plan or geographic principle at all, the latter is the result of a particular geopolitical idea: a dominium maris baltici, comprising as far as possible all the islands, bays, shores, and above all estuaries of this sea, being the arteries of trade, but hardly reaching further towards the east or into the continents than this." 17 Furthermore, "the empire-building had been accomplished by a policy of looking eastward. Sweden's road to great power and empire was over the Baltic."
18 As such, the Swedish Empire depended more upon the "cohesive force" of the Baltic Sea and the trade routes which crisscrossed its' catchment area than any natural limits at the periphery of this primarily geographically and economically defined space.
19 Swedish great power era expansion had simply followed the dominant geographical and economic trajectories in this area, aiming to control the "arteries of trade." In this sense, the Swedish Empire was a "circummarine" political entity, according to Kjellén. However, just as most other circummarine states, Sweden had lacked the necessary continental power basis from which to exercise control over this maritime region. 17 Here, Kjellén heralded the latter historiographical reinterpretation of the Swedish Empire's expansionism as less influenced by military strategic security and religious solidarity than a desire to control the trade flows in the Baltic region. Kjellén, Inledning till Sveriges geografi, 55. 18 Ibid., 54. 19 Ibid., 56. 20 Ibid., 58.
from the Baltic and towards the Atlantic, 21 aspiring to establish Sweden as a transoceanic economic actor on the power basis provided by the Scandinavian Peninsula through the union with Norway established in 1814.
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In outlining this "territorial history" as he called it, Kjellén characterized Swedish political history as determined by a kind of pendulum movement, an oscillation between "Baltic" and "Nordic" or "Scandinavian" factors. The latter, according Kjellén, had always been in the "shadow" of the former. It was rather the result of failure in the east than any success in the west. 23 This image of geopolitically determined pendulum swings in Swedish economic and political history would continue to play a significant role almost all of Kjellén's later popular science texts and political pamphlets on Sweden's international position as a small state in a world dominated by great powers. As such, it served as a key element in his programmatic use of what Åsa Linderborg has conceptualized as "history-writing as an ideological power resource."
24
A similar thesis had already been probed a few years earlier by conservative historian Harald Hjärne, who also influenced Kjellén to a considerable degree. 25 Until the late nineteenth century, Swedish historians had been mostly critical towards the Swedish Empire in general and Charles XII and his unsuccessful attempts at defending it in particular. However, in an article first published in 1889, Hjärne argued that the Swedish Empire should primarily be understood as a Baltic and economic project. From this novel perspective, it had admittedly been unsuccessful in channelling the Oriental trade across Russia towards the Western markets. But it had nevertheless successfully managed to contribute to "civilizing" Northern Europe in the process, according to Hjärne.
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In a following and highly influential 1897 article, Hjärne suggested that "Sweden's history turns since times immemorial towards the east." 21 Although not explicitly discussed by Kjellén, Its imperial experience could not be gauged from Sweden-centred studies of how its great power policies had affected Sweden itself, but from how it had contributed to the overall historical development of Eastern Europe more generally, with full inclusion of relevant Polish, Romanian, Russian, Turkish and Ukrainian perspectives. Perhaps paradoxically, Hjärne conceived of his novel historiographical program in the same nationalistic vein as many Swedes derived a sense of pride from the expansion and global reach of Swedish natural sciences since the times of Carolus Linneaus. 27 This reassessment of the Swedish Empire did not only imply a fundamental reconsideration of Charles XII, the Swedish war aims, and the military ability of the Swedish Empire in defending itself during the Great Northern War. This struggle had previously been largely seen as disastrous and futile, just as the Swedish Empire itself. Now, this struggle was reinterpreted as having been a historical necessity which secured a measure of cultural continuity in the Baltic Sea region or even Eastern Europe more broadly, as Hjärne himself suggested. This reinterpretation of the Swedish imperial experience would eventually provide a key theme for the "activist" and expansionist sentiments which began to proliferate in particular among Swedish military professionals and the Swedish security elite in the time period between the world wars, as we will see. 28 Also, this thesis would contribute to a reorientation in Swedish historiography concerning the Swedish Empire as such. Researchers increasingly begun to emphasize economic motives as driving forces of the East European policies of Charles IX and Gustavus II Adolphus, alongside the traditional explanations such as security interests and religious affinity. 29 27 The full formulation reads "Sveriges historia vetter från hedenhös åt öster och samlar sig omsider i en väldig kamp, som omfattar hela Östeuropa." Harald Hjärne, "Karl XII: en uppgift för svensk häfdaforskning," Svenskt och främmande now treated less as adventurous curiosities but as logical elements in the commercial strategy of the Swedish Empire.
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In this growing body of literature, the Swedish Empire thus reemerged, not as an aggressive and ultimately futile imperial project, but as a constructive and innovative enterpreneurial undertaking, to the benefit of not only the Baltic Sea region as such -culturally, as held by Hjärne -but also to Western European development on the whole -economically, as proposed by Kjellén. The implications of this reassessment of both the Swedish Empire and the Great Northern War can be followed in a variety of different writings on the future security as well as economy of Sweden and the wider Baltic Sea region before and immediately after the First World War, which the article now turns to discuss in greater depth.
Security: bear or eagle?
These projections of economic motives unto the history of Swedish expansionism around the rim of the Baltic Sea would eventually provide the basis for using historical analogies in projecting future Swedish security and trade policies. The military history department of the Swedish General Staff provided a key milieu for establishing this so-called "new school" as a kind of central narrative of the Swedish security elite during and after the First World War. 34 The main task of the General Staff was operational planning in the event of war. However, it also served as a center for the Swedish Army's drafting of military strategy and political lobbying. These activities were mostly assigned to a group of young officers who were considered an elite among Swedish military professionals. The officers of the General Staff regularly held important roles as governmental and parliamentary experts, tasks which they typically combined with the publication On the basis of such historical analogies, however, most Swedish conservatives concluded that a Swedish "activist" programme in the Baltic Sea region would not only necessitate a costly expansion of the Swedish armed forces. 39 It would also require an alliance with Germany, if closer cooperation between the Scandinavian countries could not be ascertained. 40 Obviously, in line with historical analogy, Russia would remain Sweden's main adversary for the foreseeable future. The most prominent spokesperson for this position was explorer and public intellectual Sven Hedin. However, several influential conservatives -notably including aforementioned Wrangel as well as Kjellén himself, both serving as representatives of the Right in the Swedish Parliament -used the very same historical analogies to reach an opposite conclusion. For their part, these conservatives noted grimly that Swedish reliance on foreign alliances had failed both in 1719-21 and 1808-09, sealing the fate of not only the Swedish Empire, but also of the Swedish-Finnish "Bothnian state," as Kjellén called it.
Indeed, Scandinavianism had proven a frail political construct during the crisis of the nineteenth century. Germany had proven little better. In fact, held Kjellén, an alliance with Germany would only make Sweden subservient to Germany's superior power and subsume it to German global interests. Sweden would run the risk of turning into a "German colony." Along with other Swedish nationalists, these conservatives regarded Germany's rising position in the Baltic Sea region with a great deal of skepticism. Kjellén only modified this position just on the verge of First World War, when he joined the mainstay of Swedish conservatives in warning for the so-called ryska faran ("the Russian menace"), demanding that Sweden should go to war on the German side, possibly by armed intervention in Finland. Second, the improved geostrategic position of Sweden after 1918 as well as the temporary Swedish regional naval supremacy in the aftermath of the wartime reductions of the Imperial German and Imperial Russian navies momentarily allowed Swedish military strategists to consider a more active role for the Swedish armed forces in an eventual future war in the region. 45 A most telling example of the latter is junior General Staff officer Axel Rappe's 1923 book Sveriges läge ("Sweden's position"). 46 Here, Rappe reiterated the whole spectrum of Kjellén's geopolitical, historical and economic argumentation in favour of an active Swedish policy towards the Baltic Sea region, again, however, without reference.
Third, these activities also alerted members of the rapidly expanding Swedish social democratic movement -split in the tumultuous year 1917 into a revolutionary and a reformist branch, respectively -to the risks posed to Swedish neutrality and hence domestic peace by any such attempts at conservative adventurism directed at the wider Baltic Sea region. To the Swedish reformist social democrats, cooperation within the League of Nations, international disarmament, and unilateral Swedish arms reductions -eventually enacted by Hjalmar Branting's social democratic government in 1925 -would provide for Sweden's regional security, rather than any activist Swedish Baltic programme, military or otherwise. a programmatic book entitled Antingen-Eller ("Either-Or") under the editorship of Helge Jung, outlining a new defence and security policy for Sweden which proved highly influential for future Swedish military strategic thinking, stretching even beyond the Second World War and into the emerging Cold War. 48 The authors underlined that any Soviet aggression directed against Finland would sooner or later also involve Sweden. As a consequence, Sweden should thus be militarily prepared to occupy Åland Islands, to block Soviet naval forces from accessing the Gulf of Bothnia, and to intervene in Finland with Swedish land forces. While these arguments resembled the Finland activism of old in terms of proposed military preparations and planning, it should formally be sanctioned under the provisions of the League of Nations, in marked contrast to the unilaterally Swedish interventions discussed by the activists during and immediately after the First World War.
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In the same year, in 1930, Swedish author, diplomat and conservative, later turned fascist ideologue, Rütger Essén, published a political treatise entitled Östersjön och östersjöpolitiken ("The Baltic Sea and the Baltic Sea policy") which sought to upgrade the significance of the Baltic Sea region in current Swedish foreign policy. 50 Like Wrangel, Rappe, and Jung before him, Essén reiterated here Hjärne's and Kjellén's main thesis on the importance of "the eastern direction" and the Baltic Sea as the central theme in Swedish history, far more crucial than ever the Scandinavian link to the west.
51 Like Kjellén, Essén considered the intermediary periods in between Swedish Baltic engagements in terms of "national depressions" -such as the two centuries in between 1719 and 1919 -when Sweden had been forced by Russia to "turn away from the Baltic Sea and its tasks."
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To Essén, these recurrent pendulum swings had allowed Swedish public opinion to forget about its position in the world, allowing it to adopt what Essén considered a moralizing view of the geopolitical contests which engage other peoples around the world, contests which the Swedes viewed themselves too civilized and too mature to be interested in. But these contests would continue nonetheless, Essén surmised, incidentally providing Sweden with new opportunities for trade, security and business, opportunities which its statesmen and citizens were all too prone to ignore. Essén, by contrast, saw a new situation emerge around the Baltic rim, where Russia had receded and the inland sea once again promised to become a medium of communication between "awakening and striving peoples:" "Finland is free. The Baltic peoples as well. Poland has been reinstated in its natural position as a balance between Russia and Germany." However, Essén bitterly remarked, "All this has been accomplished without any significant Swedish contribution." 53 Again, history would be called upon provide guidance for the future: "Is the Baltic Sea really designated to become a sea of communication among freely cooperating peoples, no longer merely a shallow moat against the irresistible and enormous Russian empire? Was the situation of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the natural state of affairs, not the situation of the nineteenth century?" Essén asked rhetorically. 54 To him, just as to Hjärne and Kjellén before him, the Baltic policy of the Swedish Empire was by no means the adventurous and aggressive expansionism it has been posthumously interpreted as. It was, according to Essén, rather a kind of trygghetspolitik ("safety policy"). 55 It had ensured cultural continuity and economic progress in the Baltic Sea region and Essén could inform his readers that it had continued to be appreciated by the Baltic peoples living "south of the Gulf of Finland" as such: "Here [i.e., in the Baltic states], Sweden possesses a valuable historical heritage and is met with more affection 51 Rütger Essén, Sverige, Östersjön och östersjöpolitiken: Ett svenskt utrikespolitiskt program (Stockholm: Sveriges nationella ungdomsförbund, 1930), 7. 52 Ibid., 8-9. 53 Ibid., 9-10. 54 Ibid., 10. 55 Ibid., 12.
and trust than hardly anywhere else in the world." 56 To Essén, the time was thus ripe in the early 1930s for what he termed Ett baltiskt trygghetsprogram ("A Baltic safety programme"), aiming to consolidate the auspicious situation around the inland sea by adding the little noun "safety" to Kjellén's geopolitical vision of two decades earlier.
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Economy: Baltic programme or Soviet treaty?
Noting the growing global interdependence and high degree of international exposure and openness of the Swedish economy by the late 1920s, mainly due to the expansion of Swedish exports as a share of national income, Essén concluded that Sweden should actively seek to capitalize on its goodwill in the wider Baltic Sea region. However, the countries of the Baltic Rim did not play any significant role in Swedish trade at the time, representing less than 1/10 of Swedish exports and less than 1/20 of imports. But, argued Essén: "[…] the relative importance of the eastern Baltic Sea countries will grow, and the great Russia beyond will under an economic development liberated from forced isolation always be a first-rate market of expansion for Sweden."
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But there are also cultural tasks awaiting in the east, in addition to the economic opportunities beckoning. Beyond the fact that technical development unites cultural and economic progress, Sweden also held a specific political duty to ensure the continued participation of the Baltic peoples in the Western legal tradition of liberty, held Essén: "This is the natural area for Swedish influence, an influence which will be exercised in forms adapted to modern conditions, devoid of any imperialistic character, an influence which will be met by a corresponding need among the yet stumbling and insecure Eastern Baltic nations." 59 This regional expansion of Swedish influence would eventually become the trademark signature of the Swedish people during the twentieth century, Essén confidently declared, just as the past century had spelt isolationism and reluctance for Sweden, with the notable exception of transatlantic migration. To Essén, just as Kjellén before him, the Baltic Rim would not limit this new Swedish activism. Rather, it would serve as the basis for its further global reach, as Swedish entrepreneurs, engineers and scientists 56 Essén, Sverige, Östersjön och östersjöpolitiken, 13-14 57 Ibid., 11, 65. 58 Ibid., 91-92. 59 Ibid., 92.
would contribute to "world trade, world technology and world culture" using the Baltic Sea region as its platform: "Hence, let us gaze eastwards, not any longer in fear, reluctance and concern, but with vivid interest, natural sense of community and wide awake activity," Essén proclaimed.
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A few years later, in 1935, Essén would return to this theme in a work of popular history, tellingly entitled Sverige upplever världen ("Sweden experiences the world"). Here, Essén underscored the significance of international outreach for Sweden's economic success and political security.
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Just as Rappe before him, Essén regularly reiterated ad verbatim Kjellén's advocacy for a Baltic programme in his treatment of Swedish future foreign policy. Their arguments often coincide, such as when Kjellén prophesied that "we will perhaps glimpse a real new era of greatness, in the east as always in Sweden's history, but this time with peaceful superiority -I am thinking of the large markets, which must arise after the Russian people's liberation." 62 To Kjellén, Sweden could again evolve into a transit route for Russian goods to Western markets as well as a provider of technology for the Russian market. 63 Just as Essén thirty years later, Kjellén wished to emphasize that this programme did not imply any aggressive imperialism. Rather, it involved a sort of cautious and tactically sensitive "resource colonialism," partly copied from contemporary German Wirtschaftsnationalismus in the Middle East, which mainly operated through trade, technology and the provision of loans and support of infrastructure investments. 64 In hindsight, these proposals for a Swedish Baltic programme appear rather unrealistic. But it is clear that the prediction of a more prominent role for Sweden in the future economic development of Russia as well as the Baltic Sea region in the aftermath of the Russian Revolutions of 1905 and 1917 and at the close of First World War were held by many observers at the time. 65 Furthermore, these views were not limited to political pamphleteers and academic project-makers, but could be found among businessmen and politicians as well. As such, these commercial aspirations for the future did not only rely on historical analogies and references to past Swedish imperialism. More recent entrepreneurial activities, such as the Nobel family's numerous business operations in Russia, especially the strategically important exploitation of Caspian oil, Oscar Dickson's and Adolf Erik Nordenskiöld's efforts in the opening up the Northeast Passage during the late nineteenth century and Sweden's transit position for the contacts between Russia and the Western Allies during the First World War provided inspiration for these grand ambitions. While initially small, Swedish business interests in Russia had in fact expanded continuously from the mid-nineteenth century until 1917. 66 Swedish economic activity in Russia before the revolution focused upon trade and establishing branch factories. 67 Five major Swedish transnational corporations had established subsidiaries and production in the country by 1915: Wicanders kork, L M Ericsson, Gasaccumulator (AGA), Allmänna Svenska Elektriska AB (ASEA) and Svenska Kullagerfabriken (SKF). Some twenty Swedish trading houses operated in Russia by 1917, importing machines, engines, tools, steel and household appliances. By the time of the revolution, Sweden ranked eighth among capital investors in Russia. Geographically, Swedish economic activities concentrated around the Baltic Rim and Northwestern Russia and Swedish corporations clustered in Saint Petersburg, Riga and Moscow. Before the 1917 revolution, the Baltic provinces served as an entry point for Swedish businesses interested in establishing commecrial activities across the vast Russian Empire. 68 The increasing fusing on Swedish economic outreach in Russia as well as the Baltic Rim featured as a prominent theme in the Swedish-sponsored so-called Baltic Exhibition held in Malmö in 1914. In response to the commercial opportunities offered to businessmen and traders based out of neutral Sweden, Swedish economic relations with Russia expanded fast in the decade before 1917. This was especially due to the First World War, which put an end to German competition and made Russia the third largest recipient of Swedish export after Germany and Great Britain in 1916. 69 This fast and unprecendented expansion naturally caused wide-ranging discussions among Swedish business circles during the war, not the least on the pages of business journal Svensk Export, on how Russian-Swedish trade could be promoted after the cession of hostilities. Numerous spokespersons and representatives of pragmatic business interests emphasized, just as Kjellén had repeatedly done in the preceding decade, that Sweden had played a far too insignificant role in both direct and transit trade with Russia if measured against Swedish potential. Here, Sweden could capitalize on the decline of traditional transit operatives such as Germany, Great Britain, Denmark and the Netherlands. The most important step would be to open up a regular and direct shipping route between Stockholm and Tallinn and to establish a free trade port in Stockholm catering to the Russian trade. 70 However, the global events which had initially allowed Swedish businesses to expand its role in Russia would also eventually limit its reach. In 1919, as Soviet Russia was placed under blockade by the Entente, Russian-Swedish trade dwindled to a minimum. Yet, there were some concerted efforts to reestablish Swedish direct trade with Siberia and areas of Southern Russia still under White control. 71 Swedish business operations abroad were not only troubled by the highly insecure post-war situation in the Baltic states, Finland and Poland, to not speak of Russia itself, but also by the volatile domestic political situation in Sweden. Importantly, the Bolsheviks had confiscated assets of Swedish corporations and private persons in Russia after the revolution, and this issue soon evolved into a serious obstacle for further Swedish-Russian commercial contacts. Contacts with the newly independent Baltic states could of course be probed, but had to be developed in competition with the ambitions of for example British capital in opening up these new markets. 72 Furthermore, Swedish trade policies were on the one hand shaped by Swedish social democrats' skepticism due to the longstanding conservative enthusiasm for "imperial" adventures in the east as well as more recent experiences with actual Swedish involvement, and on the other hand curbed by corresponding conservative concerns about the possibility of a Bolshevik victory in the Russian Civil War. 73 Due to these numerous concerns and obstacles, Swedish businessmen eventually opted for a rather cautious strategy towards the Randstaaten as well as Soviet Russia, despite the great hopes initially attached to the idea of rapid Swedish market expansion in the east immediately at the close of the First World War. 74 By contrast, Swedish official trade policies directed at Soviet Russia would prove much more successful, at least formally. 75 In spring 1920, prominent Soviet Russian diplomat Maxim Litvinov entered direct negotiations with Swedish corporations, offering Sweden major privileges regarding the East-West transit trade, under the proviso that the Swedish government recognized the Soviet regime. As a consequence of these initial contacts and negotiations, Sweden became in May 1920 the first Western country to close a trade agreement with Soviet Russia. The so-called Krasin Agreement, named for the People's Commissar for Trade and Industry, Leonid Krasin, concerned the delivery of Swedish industrial products to Soviet Russia. Krasin had arrived in Stockholm at the invitation of Hjalmar Branting's social democratic government when he received an offer from Swedish businessman Gunnar W. Andersson of 1000 locomotives to be produced by Swedish firm Nydqvist & Holm and to be delivered to the Soviets during a period of five years. 76 Around the same time, Swedish banker Olof Aschberg traded Russian gold through a Tallinn subsidiary of his bank Svenska Ekonomi AB. 77 These operations were of crucial importance for the fragile Soviet Russian regime in its attempts to circumvent the Western blockade and to obtain foreign currency in payment for the gold which could then be used in exchange for critical imports. 78 On the basis of these early contacts, several Swedish concessionaries were later granted by the Soviet industry, which were further expanded as more Scandinavian and other foreign corporations began operations in the newly established Soviet Union under the aegis of Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP). 79 As could be expected, the ability of the Swedish government to approach the Bolsheviks was highly dependent upon the lack of coordination among the Entente powers concerning their position vis-à-vis Soviet Russia. Here, Sweden could again, if only momentarily, play an important role, although not as far-reaching as projected by successive generations of Swedish conservatives such as Hjärne, Kjellén, Rappe or Essén. Nevertheless, during the early 1920s, Sweden reached pole position in Soviet Russia's foreign trade and the Soviets became some of the most important recipients of Swedish industrial products. The most important development, if seen from the Swedish horizon, is how the initially conservative ambition for Swedish trade expansion into the Russian Empire transformed during this time into a social democratic concern with closer contacts with Soviet Russia. Swedish observers both to the left and to the right thus took turns in consciously relying upon and utilizing Sweden's international position as a neutral and small country in approaching Russia when others could not. The Bolsheviks themselves were keenly aware of Sweden's position and above all its ambition as a transit point for East-West trade and sought to use it to their own benefit, just as Kjellén had predicted that the Russians would eventually do once his Baltic programme was put in motion.
Conclusions
Traditionally, Swedish conservative views upon the Baltic Sea region in general and Russia in particular have been interpreted as mostly guided by a historically informed narrative about Swedish past heroism, set in an aggressive and expansionist mindframe. It is true that Swedish conservative views on Sweden's geopolitical position in this particular regional space, past and present, have been deeply informed by sometimes unwarranted historical analogies. It is also true that much of the material surveyed for this article betrays a culturally and politically chauvinist tendency. In these works, Sweden is usually set in uncompromising opposition to Russia, its hereditary enemy, in what often appears an almost existentialist reliance upon the conception of Russia as dangerous and expansionist; at the same time culturally inferior and materially superior. In this context, however, the realistic conservative would also have to acknowledge that Sweden would always fight a losing battle if pitted against Russia. Its regional role could only be maintained as a subsidiary to Germany, supporting the latter's self-proclaimed mission of guarding "civilization" in the East.
At the same time, it has been the ambition of this article to show that there has been a competing theme present in Swedish conservative geopolitics, a theme where the promise of future Baltic pendulum swings outweighed the hopes for any Scandinavian or Nordic primacy for Sweden. This theme did not view past Swedish exploits in the east as primarily based upon either military prowess, organizational ability or strategic genius, but rather mundane, yet historically necessary, forces of economic development and geographical patterns. In this tradition, originally probed by Hjärne, further developed into a coherent thought system by Kjellén, and later reiterated by successive generations of Swedish conservative thinkers during the interwar period, the Swedish imperial experience of the past paved the way for imagining a future Baltic-Nordic cultural and economic regionalism which could rise at any time -naturally, as it were -as soon as Russia's interests turned elsewhere, either eastwards, southwards, or inwards.
Of critical importance for this tradition was Kjellén's purposive usage of geographical-historical, security and economic considerations, pointing to a geopolitical regional future programme for Sweden set in the Baltic Sea region, which were eventually picked up by other Swedish conservatives. The geopolitical speculations on the part of often marginal, but sometimes "quasi-official" representatives of the conservative academic, business, military and political elite of this small Northern European state did have some lasting impact: they paved the way for the modernization of the Swedish conservative elites' long-standing fascination with the eastern shores of the Baltic Rim and the great power status of the past, eventually resulting in a more palatable vision of Sweden's international standing as based in peaceful activities such as commerce, culture and science, rather than military aggression.
While national romanticism and nostalgia for the Swedish Empire certainly played an important part as a rallying banner for already convinced Swedish conservatives, the mere projection of heroism and memory would not suffice in attracting broader support for this agenda. Conservative opinion-makers thus continued to rely on Kjellén's "scientifically" updated advocacy for Swedish "expansionism" in their subsequent apologetics for a more ambitious Baltic-Nordic regionalism on the part of Sweden. These optics primarily seem to have served to naturalize the idea of a purposive programme towards greater Swedish activism in the Baltic Sea region and possibly elsewhere, by convincing skeptics that such ambitions were neither as chauvinist nor as futile as they may have seemed before and certainly do appear in hindsight.
This modernized view on Swedish history and geography exercised a powerful pull on the "geopolitical imagination" of conservative Swedish academics, public intellectuals and sometime politicians, even until the end of the Second World War. As such, the projection of economic motives unto history provided the basis for historical analogies to future security and trade policies which confirmed the viability of an otherwise unlikely Swedish Drang nach Osten.
Carl Marklund (b. 1974) is a Post-Doctoral Researcher, Centre for Baltic and East European Studies, Södertörn University.* * Correspondence: Carl Marklund, Centre for Baltic and East European Studies, Söder-törn University, 141 89 Huddinge, Sweden. E-mail: carl.marklund@sh.se tasandil. Esiteks vaadeldakse neid osana Balti-Skandinaavia "ootusruumi" (space of expectation) geopoliitilisest (re)konstrueerimisest mentaalse kaardistamise, geograafilise kujutlusvõime ja historiograafilise uustõlgenduse kaudu, mis tõmbasid paralleele 20. sajandi alguse ning 17. sajandi Rootsi suurvõimu-ajastu vahele. Teiseks tõlgendatakse neid ambitsioone varase püüdena luua omamoodi "pehmel jõul" põhinevat Balti-Põhjamaade regionalismi, projitseerides tulevikku erinevate mittemateriaalsete jõuressurs-side kasutamist, nagu "Rootsi" tehnilised võimekused, oskusteave ja äri-vaist, et Balti ja Vene turge Rootsi huvides rakendada. Lõpuks uuritakse Kjelléni Balti programmi pärandit ja mõju Rootsi äriringkondadele ja kaubanduspoliitika kujundajatele maailmasõdadevahelisel ajal.
Kokkuvõttes püütakse näidata, et see konkreetne nähtus -Rootsi konservatiivide poolt tulevikku projitseeritud Rootsi rahvusvaheline mõju (seda mitte ainult Läänemere regioonis ja Loode-Venemaal, vaid ka Aafrikas, Arktikas ja Kaug-Idas) -oli osa laiemast konservatiivsest Rootsi ajaloolise arengu ümbermõtestamisest. Viimane püüdis näidata Rootsi saatust millegina, mis on kujundatud eelkõige "modernsete" faktorite poolt, nagu majanduslikud huvid ja poliitilised võimalused, mitte aga puhtalt arhailisete agressiooni ja heroismi läbi. See ümbermõtestamine püüdis taaskontseptualiseerida Rootsi välispoliitilist aktivismi nii minevikus kui tulevikus ning jätta majanduslikult jätkusuutlikku, poliitiliselt turvalist ja moraalselt vastuvõetavat muljet üldsusele nii kodus, kui välismaal -seda mitte ainult konservatiividele ja rahvuslastele, vaid ka sotsiaaldemokraatidele ja liberaalidele.
